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1 INTRODUCTION
This research describes a software tool that was written to support NASA’s Remote 
Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project. The work was supported by the NASA Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
1.1 Background
The prevention of system failure in space applications is extremely important. The 
consequences of failures can be costly and hazardous. Of particular concern are temporary 
errors, specifically, those due to transient faults. Transient faults are induced by external 
perturbation such as power supply fluctuations or radiation. In space applications, they are 
predominantly caused by alpha particle radiation. As a result, many companies aim to produce 
radiation-hardened systems to be used in space programs. However, these systems are often 
more costly, higher in volume, higher in mass and power consumption, and lower in 
performance than components presently available off-the-shelf. In particular, today’s 
microprocessors that are available commercially have many advantages over those in radiation- 
hardened systems. Commonly referred to as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, these 
microprocessors are readily available, of high packaging density, cheap, capable of supporting 
extensive software, and consume relatively low power [1], With the increased use of software in 
space and the drive toward smaller, faster, better, and more cost-effective satellites, COTS 
systems are attractive for use in computer-based satellite systems. However, since COTS 
microprocessors are not radiation-hardened, they are much more vulnerable to transient failures 
[2]. As a result, various tools and methodologies are being researched to tolerate the effects of 
radiation on COTS microprocessors in space applications.
The NASA Remote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project attempts to improve the 
reliability of COTS microprocessors by supporting research devoted to bringing commercial 
supercomputing technology into space. The design of highly reliable computer systems requires 
a thorough understanding of errors in the underlying COTS components, of which a 
microprocessor is the principal part. There are many factors that make a microprocessor more 
susceptible to radiation induced upsets. However, there is currently little data for analyzing and
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detecting transient errors in microprocessors. The research described in this paper is part of the 
REE project and employs a new method for detecting errors in a microprocessor due to radiation. 
A high-level software tool has been created to detect and characterize radiation-induced errors in 
space borne applications running on COTS components.
1.2 Software Tool Description
The software tool developed for this research runs on a microprocessor to measure the error 
rate and estimate the location of any errors encountered. It is broken down into separate routines 
for each testable hardware unit in a microprocessor and it keeps count of the number of errors 
found in each unit. In this research, a testable hardware unit can be defined as a collection of 
circuitry where most transient errors occurring in that circuitry can be detected and attributed to 
that circuitry in a high-level language. Typically, a microprocessor is made up of many 
hardware units, several of which are testable. Chapter 5 describes in further detail the general 
hardware units of a microprocessor and which ones are considered to be testable from a high- 
level language.
Each routine in the program uses a sequence of computations that are performed millions of 
times in a loop as a way of testing the specific hardware. The operations in each routine are 
chosen in such a way as to maximize the switching activity in the corresponding circuitry. Also, 
the error latency in a given unit is minimized by flooding it with millions of operations per 
second. This increases the error coverage by utilizing as much of the circuitry as possible as fast 
as possible.
There are many advantages of this self-monitoring software tool for error measurements. It 
has excellent potential for accurate localization of a single-event upset (SEU) to within a small 
functional block. Errors found by this tool will have a latency of only a few instruction cycles in 
most cases. Also, the probability of capturing an SEU is very high with the use of enhanced 
signal activities and the creation of sensitized paths. The tool is portable to different systems and 
can be used during long space missions to periodically measure the error rates. The error rates 
can vary during a long mission due to a changing environment and possibly due to aging of the 
electronics on the chip. Such a tool can give an early warning to the system of increased error 
rates.
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Some assumptions are made for the tool to work successfully. The type and frequency of 
the errors are assumed to be such that the error rate is not so high as to crash the monitoring tool 
very frequently. The only data in that case would be the system crash rate, not an error rate. The 
errors that do not cause an immediate crash are the most worrisome. They are also far more 
likely than catastrophic errors, and if they are not detected early, they can multiply and lead to a 
system crash or to additional new errors. For these reasons, the most interesting case for 
measurement is for infrequent SEUs.
3
2 RELATED WORK
Determining the suitability of COTS microprocessors for space applications is a subject of 
ongoing research. Normally, this involves predicting the expected single-event upset (SEU) rate 
in the microprocessor when it is flown in space. This is generally done using ground-based 
radiation tests where the device to be tested is exposed to an appropriate particle beam, and 
subsequently checked to determine if there have been any state changes. The results from these 
tests are used to predict the underlying SEU rate of the device. Over the last several years, many 
ideas related to testing the effects of SEUs on microprocessors have been presented:
• In [2], software tools are presented for predicting the rate and nature of observable SEU- 
induced errors in microprocessor systems. These tools are built around a commercial 
microprocessor simulator and are used to analyze real satellite application systems.
• In [3], the impact of physical fault injection of transient faults on processor execution is 
assessed. The fault injection is based on two complementary methods using (1) heavy- 
ion radiation, and (2) power supply disturbances. Approximately 12,000 transient faults 
were injected into the target microprocessor, a Motorola MC6809E 8-bit CPU, running 
three different workloads. Three error-detection mechanisms (two software-based 
mechanisms and one watchdog timer) were combined and used to detect as many errors 
as possible.
• Also, in [4], two generations of the 80Cx86 microprocessor family and two floating­
point digital signal processors (DSP) were tested for single-event effects (SEE). The 
SEE rates for each of the device types were measured and the upset vulnerability was 
correlated to the size of the program running on each processor.
• In [5], the SEU rates of the Pentium MMX and Pentium II microprocessors using proton 
irradiation are determined. An evaluation of the performance of these microprocessors 
in the space radiation environment is also presented. Test software was used to 
determine the SEU behavior of the ALU, FPU, registers, and cache memory functional 
blocks of the microprocessors. A comparison is given of each processor’s susceptibility 
to proton irradiation in various modes of operation.
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• Similarly, in [6], SEE test results are given for the Intel 80386 family and the 80486 
microprocessor. Both single-event upset and latchup conditions were monitored.
• Another study by Asenek [7] predicts the rate of observable SEU-induced errors in a 
microprocessor system by measuring the errors in terms of the SEU application cross- 
section as opposed to the SEU cross-section as a function of the device’s technology 
only. A software tool is used to do the predictions as the microprocessor executes real 
application software. Results obtained from simulating the nature of SEU-induced 
errors are shown to correlate with ground-based radiation test data.
Although this work offers useful information on the susceptibility of a particular 
microprocessor to transient errors, the data is still somewhat limited. They all present data for 
specific microprocessors and do not attempt to localize the errors. Also, none of the tools is 
portable to other systems. It is more desirable to produce results that can be applied to any 
system and to run the tools on any microprocessor, which is what this research attempts to do.
Another area of related work is that done by the NASA Remote Exploration and 
Experimentation (REE) project itself. The REE Project is working to incorporate a custom, but 
architecturally insensitive, software implemented fault tolerance (SIFT) middleware layer, as 
well as a generic library of algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) techniques, to enable the 
direct use of latest generation commercial hardware and software components in future space 
systems. This strategy will allow high throughput computation even in the presence of relatively 
high rates of radiation-induced transient upsets as well as in the presence of permanent faults. 
Previous work in this area includes:
• A first-generation testbed presented in [8] is created to test the above concepts. The 
testbed is equipped with fault injection capabilities and is constructed out of COTS 
hardware and software. The methodology used to develop a detailed radiation fault 
model for the REE testbed architecture is discussed. Also, result checking is suggested 
as a way of enforcing hardware/software reliability. Result checking relies on 
developing tests that can confirm the validity of operation output. Their work focuses on 
computation errors inherent in the system, rather than on environmentally induced faults.
• Huang and Abraham [9] introduce ABFT—a technique that encodes matrices using 
checksum matrices. These are then used to detect and correct faults in matrix
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operations. They address matrix operations performed using processor arrays with 
regard to detecting errors generated by a faulty processor within the array.
• Jou and Abraham [10] present an ABFT error detection scheme for FFT networks. The 
method employs an encoding and decoding scheme to detect single errors.
Other work at the microprocessor level have primarily focused on vulnerability assessment 
and software detection methods:
• In [11] a detailed analysis of the vulnerability of the Z80 microprocessor, based on ion- 
bombardment testing, is presented.
• In [12], a simulation tool called DYNAMO is used to study the effects of transient faults 
in large digital circuits.
• In [13], a series of experiments aimed at error analysis through the physical insertion of 
faults have been conducted at the NASA AIRLAB test-bed facility. An experimental 
analysis is presented to study the susceptibility of a microprocessor-based jet engine 
controller to upsets caused by current and voltage transients.
• In [14], a hierarchical error detection framework for a software implemented fault 
tolerance (SIFT) layer is proposed for a distributed system. A four-level error detection 
hierarchy is proposed in the context of Chameleon, a software environment for providing 
adaptive fault-tolerance in an environment of COTS system components and software. 
The design and implementation of a software-based distributed signature-monitoring 
scheme is described.
• In [15], the design and evaluation of a preemptive control signature technique (PECOS) 
for on-line detection of control flow errors is presented. The technique uses assertions 
that can be embedded in the assembly language code and that are triggered by control 
flow instructions in the code. PECOS can detect errors in control flow that spans 
multiple subroutines or source files as well as control-flow, which is determined at 
runtime. Software-based error injection techniques are used to evaluate PECOS.
• In [16], PECOS is used in combination with a data audit subsystem to eliminate fail- 
silence violations, reduce the incidence of crashes, and eliminate hangs. Software- 
implemented error injection is performed to evaluate the system.
All of the above studies are based on low-level hardware-specific techniques. The research 
described in this paper differs in that the tool used to detect and locate transient errors is portable
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across multiple platforms and can be used in a multitude of setups. The goal in using COTS 
microprocessors is to reduce cost and increase performance. Our tool supports that by providing 
error analysis while not limiting the type of microprocessors or systems to be used.
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3 TRANSIENT ERROR OVERVIEW
A transient error is an error that can appear and disappear within a very short period of time. 
They are temporary or nonpermanent and may arise in a working circuit during its operation due 
to a variety of noise sources [12]. For example, internal noise sources such as power transients 
and capacitive and inductive crosstalk are common causes, as well as external noise sources such 
as cosmic particle hits (e.g., alpha particles) [6]. Cosmic particles are the common cause of 
transient errors in space applications; therefore, it is the alpha particle hits that are of most 
interest in this work. However, the other sources of transient errors can be used for test 
purposes.
3.1 Single-Event Upsets
A single-event upset (SEU) is a type of transient error that is commonly caused by alpha 
particle radiation. A SEU is a soft error introduced when an ionizing heavy ion penetrates the 
depletion region of a reversed-biased pn-junction. The heavy ion affects only stored information 
by changing bit values from 0 to 1 or vice versa. The majority of heavy ions affect only single 
bits. No hardware is damaged by the ions. The SEUs are assumed to occur randomly both in 
time and in position within a circuit. Typically the transient introduced by an alpha particle lasts 
only for a very short period of time, on the order of a fraction of a nanosecond [3].
Transient faults and SEUs are produced in today’s microprocessors in several ways. Such 
things as lower supply voltages and lower transistor threshold values make a microprocessor 
more susceptible to transient errors. Also, lower noise margins, current leakage, and charge 
injections in dynamic circuits contribute to the susceptibility of microprocessors to SEUs. The 
higher density of interconnects and the high slew rate of logic signals together make crosstalk 
due to capacitive coupling a serious problem. Some circuit defects such as resistive shorts and 
opens are missed by the manufacturing tests.
3.2 Analysis of Transient Faults
It has been reported that transient faults account for 80% or more of the failures in digital 
systems [12]. The effect of these transient faults is to change the behavior of the digital circuit in
8
some unexpected manner, often producing incorrect results. If the digital system is a critical 
application, such as a biomedical, space, military, or avionic application, the results could be 
catastrophic. If the critical areas in the circuit that are more susceptible to transient-fault 
disturbances are identified, appropriate actions may be taken to prevent those catastrophes.
To analyze the nature of SEU-induced errors in microprocessor systems, it is useful to 
predict the rate of observable SEU-induced errors in microprocessor systems and to identify and 
classify the errors into different categories. It is also useful to understand whether the occurrence 
of an SEU will cause a system to fail catastrophically or to simply lose service for short duration. 
This is essential in justifying its suitability for a particular application or mission.
SEUs affecting data are associated with upsets in the execution units such as the ALU, FPU, 
or data cache. SEUs affecting control result in program flow errors (sequencing errors), upsets 
in the instruction fetch unit or the branch prediction unit. These are more severe than data errors 
since SEUs affecting control would be expected to cause an exception. However, SEUs 
affecting data are particularly troublesome because they typically have fewer obvious 
consequences than an SEU affecting control. It should be noted that since memory will be error 
detecting and correcting, faults to memory would be largely screened; most data faults will 
therefore affect the microprocessor or its cache.
In [7], results were obtained from simulating the nature of SEU-induced errors in a 
microprocessor as well as results from radiation tests causing SEUs. The experiments in this 
paper used an 8052 microprocessor system executing the COTS2 operating system program [7]. 
For the radiation tests, of the 131 observed errors, approximately 31% were due to transient 
errors, 64% were resets, 5% were propagated errors. This data is useful because it gives us a feel 
for the type and frequency of errors we should expect in a microprocessor exposed to radiation.
3.3 Fault Models
Fault models are typically used to help us characterize the behavior of errors. We make the 
assumption that faults behave according to some fault model. This allows us to specifically 
define the types of faults that will be considered and the behavior these faults will have [14].
Also, we can represent the behavior of physical occurrences. Several defects are usually mapped 
to one fault model. Fault models are not 100% accurate, but they make problems tractable and 
represent the types of faults that can occur. The general fault model used for transient faults in
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this research includes incorrect signal values caused by coupled disturbance. These disturbances 
include those due to particle irradiation. The fault models and types of errors expected for 
specific microprocessor units are presented in Chapter 5.
Since the software tool designed in this project is intended for use in space applications 
where radiation exposure is imminent, a radiation fault model proves to be helpful. In a non­
radiation hardened system, faults due to radiation are not prevented, but rather allowed to occur. 
The error (the logical manifestation of the fault as seen by the system or software) or a 
subsequent manifestation due to propagation of the error is then detected and handled by the 
software [8]. Clearly, the design of such a system is dependent on a detailed understanding of 
the types of faults that will occur, the errors generated by these faults, and the rate at which they 
will appear.
It is useful to predict what types of errors will be generated, under what conditions the 
system will become bogged down in error handling, and under what conditions errors will 
propagate through the system error detection and containment boundaries. It is for this reason 
we have developed the software tool described in this paper. Its ultimate purpose is to output a 
real-time error rate so that decisions can be made on the vulnerability of the system as well as 
individual components of the processor.
The principle faults for the REE environments are single bit flips; however, there is an 
expectation that multiple bit flips will become more prevalent due to shrinking feature sizes [8]. 
In this fault mode, several physically adjacent cells may be disrupted by the passage of a single 
energetic particle. However, these single-event multiple upsets are still relatively rare and for 
this research, they are not considered.
From a high-level point of view, faults due to radiation can be grouped into two types:
• Latch faults include latches, flip-flops, memory cells, and any other structure that 
persistently stores a bit. ‘Visible’ latches are included, such as data registers, as are 
‘invisible’ latches, which are used to implement structures such as instruction pipeline 
stages and processor register reservation scoreboards [8].
• Gate faults occur when a SEU happens at approximately the same time as a clock 
transition, thus causing the gate to flip its effective bit value [8].
Due to the tight timing required for a gate fault to propagate to, and be latched by, a register, 
faults in latches are tens of thousands of times more likely than faults at the gate level, or
10
combinatorial logic. As the clock rate increases, this difference will shrink due to the increased 
fraction of time available for combinatorial logic to present erroneous values to registers, which 
may then latch these transients [8].
The goal of this section is to provide a basic idea of what types of faults are expected from 
radiation and how these faults relate to errors that may be produced. More information on these 
types of faults and the fault model structure can be found in [8]. The types of errors expected in 
specific functional blocks of a microprocessor from this fault model can be found in Chapter 5. 
Also, the functional modules of each unit are examined to determine the effects of errors on their 
behavior.
11
4 SOFTWARE ERROR DETECTION TECHNIQUES
Many software fault detection techniques have been implemented in the past. However, all 
of these techniques attempt to change the original application code in some way, or they are 
coded completely in machine language, which makes them very difficult to port to other systems. 
Also, they are often nondeterministic in that it is unknown what instruction sequences will be 
executed and what the results of various operations in the application will be at any given time. 
The tool described in this thesis is a stand-alone program that was written from scratch in a high- 
level language, therefore making it deterministic as well as portable. It is known in advance 
what instructions will be executed and what the results of those instructions should be. This 
allows the use of some common software error detection techniques such as time redundancy and 
consistency checks to detect the transient errors occurring in a COTS microprocessor.
4.1 Time Redundancy
Time redundancy is a method that uses the repetition of computations in ways that allow 
errors to be detected. Figure 1 illustrates this idea with a block diagram. The fundamental 
concept is to perform the same computation two or more times and compare the results to 
determine if a discrepancy exists. If an error is detected, the computations can be performed 
again to see if the disagreement remains or disappears [17]. If the discrepancy remains, then 
there is a permanent error present; however, if the discrepancy disappears, then a transient error 
has occurred.
4.2 Consistency Checks
Consistency checks are used as another means of capturing transient errors in software.
They use a priori knowledge about the characteristics of information to verify the correctness of 
that information. For example, when adding two known numbers, such as 2 and 3, we know 
that the result should be 5. If the result is not 5 at the moment it is checked, then some sort of 
error is present. Combining this idea with the time redundancy method above, the addition can 
be performed several times, and if the result is consistently something other than 5, there is most
12
likely a permanent error present. However, if the result is 5 most of the time and something 
other than 5 the rest of the time, then there is likely a transient error occurring.
Time
to+nA
Figure 1: Time Redundancy Example.
The software program described in this paper uses consistency checks as the primary 
methods of detecting errors. A loop consisting of a group of operations that are checked for 
correctness upon completion is executed millions of times. Figure 2 illustrates the basic 
flowchart used for each routine when testing the functional units of the microprocessor.
13
Figure 2: Flowchart for Functional Unit Routines.
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5 PROCESSOR MODEL
To aid in localizing any errors encountered, the microprocessor is represented in terms of its 
functional hardware units. A fault model is then developed for each of these functional units. In 
this way, computations can be generated to test each unit without the detailed knowledge of how 
the instruction sequencing and control section for each unit are implemented. Also, some units 
can be broken down into smaller units if it is possible to localize errors to smaller areas in the 
circuitry. For example, the integer unit can be broken down into an add unit, a subtract unit, a 
multiply unit, etc., because they all use different hardware that can be tested explicitly from a 
high-level program. However, some units, such as the branch processing unit, cannot be broken 
down further because it is impossible to write a high-level computation that will exclusively test 
its subunits such as the branch prediction hardware.
Also, for portability purposes, some basic assumptions are made about the processor when 
developing the software tool. First, it is assumed that the registers are of size 32 bits. Second, it 
is assumed that certain execution and control units exist in all COTS processors. It is understood 
that there are other units unique to specific processors, for example a vector unit; however, these 
are not targeted directly in this version of the software tool. Third, because there are many ways 
to implement each functional unit, we will concentrate on obtaining high switching on the inputs 
and outputs and assume that this will maximize the activity in any given design.
The execution units assumed to be common to all COTS processors as well as their subunit 
circuitry that can be tested are as follows:
• Integer units 1 and 2
• Addition
• Subtraction
• Multiplication
• Division
• Logical AND
• Logical OR
• Logical XOR
• Register unit
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• Floating point unit
• Addition
• Subtraction
• Multiplication
• Division
• Data cache unit
• Load/store unit
The control units assumed to be common to all COTS processors are:
• Instruction fetch unit
• Branch processing unit
The instruction fetch unit encompasses components such as the instruction cache, the 
instruction register, the dispatch unit, and any other hardware involved in fetching instructions. 
The branch processing unit includes hardware such as the branch target instruction cache, the 
branch history table, control registers, and any other circuitry involved in branch prediction.
There are other units not mentioned above that are extremely difficult to test from a high- 
level program and are therefore left out when generating the test routines. For example, 
detecting errors occurring in the memory management unit (MMU), the reservation stations, the 
completion unit, and the bus interface unit cannot be thoroughly and exclusively accomplished in 
a high-level program. Also, differentiating between errors in the LI and L2 cache is difficult. 
But, even though errors in these units are not tested for explicitly, many other operations that are 
performed will utilize these units, and if errors occur, it is possible that they will be detected 
indirectly.
The preliminary version of the tool developed in this research was written for a Motorola 
PowerPC processor -  the MPC750. A block diagram of this processor is shown in Figure 3. The 
MPC750 processor contains all of the units described previously and provides a basis for the 
software tool. The results presented in Chapter 12 are gathered from testing the tool on the 
MPC750.
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Figure 3: MPC750 Processor Block Diagram.
The following chapters present more detail on how the testing was done for each unit. 
However, it should be pointed out that the work for this research was split between two students 
and, as a result, only certain units are discussed in this thesis. For a detailed description on how 
the data cache and the floating point unit were tested, please refer to the thesis to be written by 
Hari Kommaraju [18].
17
6 TESTING THE INTEGER UNITS
It is assumed that any COTS processor used in the space applications will have at least two 
integer units. Typically, these integer units have slightly different purposes. In the MPC750 
processor shown in Figure 3, integer unit 1 is used for all integer computations, whereas integer 
unit 2 is used only for addition. There may be other integer units in other processors, but we will 
assume that it is sufficient to test for two.
In general, integer unit 1 is assumed to encompass the following operations:
• Addition
• Subtraction
• Multiplication
• Division
• Logical AND
• Logical OR
• Logical XOR
Each of the above operations uses different logic within the integer unit and each requires a 
different operational code (opcode) value in the corresponding instruction. Any errors found 
while performing the above operations can be attributed to the particular logic for that operation.
Integer unit 2 is assumed to provide only addition. The specific details of how the processor 
decides which integer unit an addition instruction will be allocated to are unknown. As a result, 
integer unit 2 must be tested in conjunction with integer unit 1. To guarantee that integer unit 2 
is utilized, integer unit 1 must be busy. This is accomplished by issuing integer multiplies in 
between integer additions. Since integer unit 2 can only do additions, the multiplications are sent 
to integer unit 1 and the subsequent additions will be sent to integer unit 2.
Any error in the integer units can be covered with the appropriate fault model. Each integer 
operation can be broken down into several identical logic gates that can be referred to as cells. 
Each cell represents the computation for one “slice” of the data. For example, the adder cell 
performs the addition of 3 bits and the logical AND cell performs the AND of 2 bits. The general 
fault assumption at the cell level is that a faulty cell can change its behavior in any arbitrary way,
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as long as it remains a combinational circuit [19]. Also, an appropriate cell fault model can 
cover any fault in the intercell array.
The operations used for each integer routine are either independent or dependent 
computations. The independent computations are executed in a separate loop from that of the 
dependent computations. Independent computations are executed one after another, and then the 
consistency checks are performed after the last computation completes. The idea is to fill up the 
arithmetic pipeline by flooding it with operations. This will exercise the pipeline hardware and 
control, and it will indirectly check for some types of control flow errors. If the program 
erroneously jumps from the middle of the computations to the middle of the consistency checks, 
then the next consistency check will fail.
The dependent computations are performed so that one operation must complete before the 
next one can execute. Several operations are performed in a row, and then a single consistency 
check is performed at the end. These types of instructions will introduce bubbles in the pipeline 
and exercise different pipeline control than that of the independent computations. They will also 
check for some types of control flow errors. If the program erroneously jumps from the start of 
the dependent computations to the end of the dependent computations, then the final consistency 
check will fail.
The pipeline control for independent and dependent instructions is different and can be 
exercised by performing the independent and dependent operations described above. Dependent 
operations in a pipeline typically require more complex control than independent operations, and 
this is a good way to check the functionality of that hardware. Code examples for the 
independent as well as the dependent operations can be found in most of the sections that follow. 
The logical operations are only tested with independent computations because they typically do 
not take many clock cycles to execute.
6.1 Addition
The fault model used for integer addition is the multiple cell fault model (MCFM), which 
means that all of the cells can be faulty [19]. In the MCFM, an adder can be tested by a 
minimum test set of size 11 independent of the number of cells in the array. An example of the 
minimum test set is given in Table 1. Each test vector has a periodic pattern. For any arbitrary 
adder, the test set in Table 1 tests every cell with all input combinations. If there is a faulty cell,
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at least one of the two sum outputs of this faulty cell and its next cell will be different from the 
correct value. Therefore, this test set is sufficient to completely test any ripple carry adder under 
MCFM. Consistency checks in the program are used to catch these errors. Figure 4 shows a 
code excerpt with the independent operations along with the consistency checks. Figure 5 also 
shows a small code excerpt with some of the dependent additions where each subsequent 
addition depends on the previous result and a final check is performed at the end.
Table 1: Minimum Test Set for Ripple Carry Adders Under MCFM [19].
vector co xoyo x iy i X&2 X3y3 x5y5 . . .
t l 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . .
t2 0 00 01 00 01 00 01 . . .
Ö 0 01 00 01 00 01 00 . . .
t4 0 00 10 00 10 00 10 . . .
t5 0 10 00 10 00 10 00 . . .
t6 0 00 11 00 11 00 11 . . .
t7 0 11 00 11 00 11 00 . . .
t8 (t8’) 1(0) 00(10) 00 11 00 00 11 . . .
t9 (t9’) 1(0) 01(11) 01 01 01 01 01 . . .
tlO (tlO’) 1(0) 10(11) 10 10 10 10 10 . . .
t i l  ( t i l ’) 1(0) 11 11 11 11 11 11 . . .
Note that in Table 1, control over the carry bit, Co, is required in some of the vectors (t8 -  
til) . However, from a high-level program, it is difficult, if not impossible, to explicitly set the 
carry-in bit. As a result, these vectors must be modified. The Xoyo bits for vectors t8-tl 1 are 
modified so that the carry will be rippled through as intended. The new vectors are labeled t8’- 
tl 1’ and represent the changes made in parenthesis shown in the table.
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ChecklntegerAddition() 
register int RO, Rl;
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
RO = 0x00000000 + 0x00000000; // vector tl 
Rl = 0x00000000 + Oxaaaaaaaa; // vector t2
if (R0 != Oxaaaaaaaa) UpdateStats(Err, ia); 
if (Rl != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(Err, ia);
_ J ______________________________________________________
Figure 4: Example Code for Independent Integer Addition Operations.
ChecklntegerAddition() 
register int R0;
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
R0 = 0x00000000;
R0 = R0 + OxOfffffff;
R0 = R0 + OxOfffffff;
R0 = R0 + OxOfffffff;
if (R0 != OxfffffffO) UpdateStats(Err, ia);
}
Figure 5: Example Code for Dependent Integer Addition Operations.
6.2 Subtraction
The fault model used for subtraction is the same as that for addition. Also, the same 
functional vectors are used. A separate routine is used for subtraction because subtraction 
involves one more step than addition -  a 2’s complement step -  and the instruction code for 
subtraction will be different. The common implementation for subtraction is to take the 2’s 
complement of the subtrahend and add it to the minuend.
It is possible that the subtraction hardware uses hardware for addition to generate the result. 
It is therefore recommended that the routine for addition be executed immediately before the 
routine for subtraction. If no errors are present in the addition routine, then any errors occurring 
in the subtraction routine are most likely due to the extra hardware required for subtraction.
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6.3 Multiplication
There are several algorithms and hardware designs for implementing multiplication. The 
goal in this program is to use vectors that will maximize the switching of the multiplication 
steps. Ideally, we would like every bit in the multiplicand, the multiplier, and the product to 
change value during each cycle. However, this is difficult to do without knowing the exact 
hardware implementation in the system. The best that we can do is to choose operands that 
maximize switching at the inputs and also at the outputs. Table 2 shows the vectors used for 
integer multiplication along with the number of bits that are switching in the inputs and outputs 
from one multiplication to the next. To clarify, between the first and second multiplies, i.e., lines 
1 and 2 in the table, 16 bits switch in the first input, 16 bits switch in the second input, and 16 
bits switch in the output. Both signed and unsigned numbers of the same magnitude are used.
Table 2: Vectors for Integer Multiplication.
Multiplicand Input Bits Switching Multiplier
Input Bits 
Switching Product
Output Bits 
Switching
0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0000ffff 16 0x0000ffff 16 OxfffeOOOl 16
0x00000000 16 Oxaaaaaaaa 16 0x00000000 16
Oxffffffff • 32 0x00000001 17 Oxffffffff 32
0x00005555 24 0x00005555 7 0xlC718e39 17
0x00000001 7 Oxffffffff 24 Oxffffffff 17
0x0000aaaa 9 0x0000aaaa 24 0x71c638e4 17
0x00004924 9 0x00004924 9 0xl4e58dl0 17
0x0000ffff 11 0x00000002 15 OxOOOlfffe 16
0x00009249 10 0x00009249 7 0x539758Dl 18
0x00002492 11 0x00002492 11 0x05396344 18
Also, dependent multiplications are performed where each subsequent multiply depends on 
the previous result and a final check is performed at the end. Table 3 shows the computations for 
each step, each intermediate value, the final result expected, and the number of bits switching in 
the output between each computation. While these methods do not accomplish perfect switching 
among the bits for each output, they are satisfactory in attempting to catch errors in the 
multiplication loop.
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Table 3: Dependent Integer Multiplication Vectors.
Multiply Operation Intermediate result Bits Switching 
in the Output
UiRO = OxOOOOOOOf; OxOOOOOOOf
uiRO = uiRO * 0x0000001b; 0x00000195 5
uiRO = uiRO * 0x0000001b; 0x00002ab7 5
uiRO = uiRO * 0x0000001b; 0x0004814d 12
uiRO = uiRO * 0x0000001b; 0x0079a31f 11
uiRO = uiRO * 0x0000001b; 0x0cd43445 16
uiRO = uiRO * 0x00000002; 0xl9a8688a 18
uiRO = uiRO * 0x00000002; 0x3350dll4 18
uiRO = uiRO * 0x00000002; 0x66ala228 18
uiRO = uiRO * 0x00000002; 0xcd4 34 4 50 18
Final Result 0xcd434 450
6.4 Division
Division involves several of the same issues addressed in creating the vectors for 
multiplication. Again, it is difficult to maximize the switching in the hardware without knowing 
the exact implementation. The vectors are chosen so that the bits in the dividend, divisor, and 
quotient are switching as frequently as possible in a high-level program. Table 4 shows these 
vectors along with the number of bits that are switching in the inputs and outputs from one 
divide to the next. Both signed and unsigned integers with the same magnitude are tested.
Table 4: Vectors for Integer Division.
Dividend Input Bits Switching Divisor
Input Bits 
Switching Quotient
Output Bits 
Switching
0x00000000 Oxffffffff 0x00000000
Oxffffffff 32 0x00000001 31 Oxffffffff 32
Oxcccccccc 16 0x00000004 2 0x33333333 16
0x33333333 32 0x00000003 3 Oxllllllll 8
Oxaaaaaaaa 16 0x22222222 9 0x00000005 9
0x55555555 32 0x55555555 24 0x00000001 1
0x80000000 17 0x08888888 23 OxOOOOOOOf 3
Oxeeeeeeee 23 0x00000002 8 0x77777777 21
0x11111110 31 0x00000002 0 0x08888888 31
Oxcccccccc 23 0x00000003 1 0x44444444 15
Oxffffffff 16 OxOOOOffff 14 0x00010001 10
OxffffOOOO 16 OxOOOOffff 0 0x00010000 1
OxOOOOffff 32 OxOOOOOOOf 12 0x00001111 5
Oxffffffff 16 OxffffOOOO 20 0x00000001 4
0x00000001 31 Oxffffffff 16 Oxffffffff 31
0x44444444 9 0x00000002 31 0x22222222 24
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As in the multiplication routine, some dependent divisions are performed where each 
subsequent divide depends on the previous quotient and a final check is performed at the end. 
Table 5 shows the computations for each step, each intermediate value, the final result expected, 
and the number of bits switching in each intermediate result. While this does not accomplish 
perfect switching among the bits for each intermediate result, it is satisfactory in attempting to 
catch control flow errors in the division loop.
Table 5: Dependent Integer Division Vectors.
Divide Operation Intermediate result Bits Switching
UiRO = Oxf0000000; OxfOOOOOOO
uiRO = uiRO / 0x00000001; OxfOOOOOOO 0
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x10000000 3
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x01111111 8
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x00123456 9
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x000136b0 9
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x000014b6 5
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x00000161 9
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x00000017 6
uiRO = uiRO / OxOOOOOOOf; 0x00000001 3
Final Result 0x00000001
6.5 Logical AND
The vectors used for the logical AND operation are derived so that every input combination 
for each cell in the AND gate array is implemented. These vectors are easy to develop since 
there are no carry bits and every gate in the computation is independent of the others. The truth 
table for a single AND gate cell is shown in Table 6. The columns labeled ‘x’ and ‘y’ represent 
the inputs, and the column labeled ‘x AND y’ represents the output for the corresponding inputs. 
If there is a fault in any gate in the cell array, one of these input vectors will propagate the error 
to the output so that it can be detected.
Figure 6 shows an example of the code using the input vectors outlined in Table 6. The 
format of the code for all of the integer routines is essentially the same. The operations are 
performed with the defined vectors and then subsequent consistency checks are executed to 
check for errors. This process is then repeated in a loop.
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Table 6: Truth Table for AND Function.
X y x AND y
0 0 0
0 l 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
In addition to the input vectors described in Table 6, other random vectors are used to 
increase the number of logical AND operations to be executed. It is important to flood the 
hardware with enough operations so that it is constantly in use and so that the error latency is 
minimized.
CheckLogicalAND() 
register int RO, RI, R2, R3;
for
RO
R1
R2
R3
(int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS 
= 0x00000000 & 0x00000000; // 
= 0x00000000 & Oxffffffff; // 
= Oxffffffff & 0x00000000; // 
= Oxffffffff & Oxffffffff; //
; i++) 
inputs 
inputs 
inputs 
inputs
00
01
10
11
if (R0 != 0x00000000)
if (R1 != 0x00000000)
if (R2 != 0x00000000)
if (R3 != Oxffffffff)
UpdateStats(Err, la) ; 
UpdateStats(Err, la); 
UpdateStats(Err, la); 
UpdateStats(Err, la);
Figure 6: Example Code for the Logical AND Routine.
6.6 Logical OR
The routine to test the logical OR hardware is similar to that of the logical AND. Table 7 
shows the truth table for the logical OR function. As in the logical AND routine, all of the 
possible inputs combinations into the logical OR hardware are tested. Figure 7 exemplifies the 
code used in testing the logical OR routine. Also, as in the logical AND routine, other input 
vectors are used to flood the hardware with computations, each of which aims to maximize 
switching in the hardware.
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Table 7: Truth Table for OR Function.
X y x OR y
0 0 0
0 l 1
1 0 1
1 l 1
CheckLogicalOR()
register int RO, Rl, R2, R3;
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
RO = 0x00000000 | 0x00000000; // inputs 00
Rl = 0x00000000 | Oxffffffff; // inputs 01
R2 = Oxffffffff | 0x00000000; // inputs 10
R3 = Oxffffffff | Oxffffffff; // inputs 11
if (R0 != 0x00000000) UpdateStats(Err, lo);
if (Rl != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(Err, lo);
if (R2 != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(Err, lo);
if
1
(R3 != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(Err, lo);
Figure 7: Example Code for the Logical OR Routine.
6.7 Logical XOR
The logical XOR routine follows the same ideas as that of the logical AND and the logical 
OR routines. The truth table for the logical XOR operation is shown in Table 8, along with a 
code excerpt in Figure 8. Again, other vectors are also used to flood the hardware with 
computations.
Table 8: Truth Table for XOR Function.
X y x XOR y
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
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CheckLogicalXOR()
register int RO, Rl, R2, R3;
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
RO = 0x00000000 A 0x00000000; // inputs 00
Rl = 0x00000000 A Oxffffffff; // inputs 01
R2 - Oxffffffff A 0x00000000; // inputs 10
R3 = Oxffffffff A Oxffffffff; // inputs 11
if (R0 != 0x00000000) UpdateStats (Err, lx); 
if (Rl != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(Err, lx); 
if (R2 != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats (Err, lx); 
if (R3 != 0x00000000) UpdateStats(Err, lx);
____
Figure 8; Example Code for the Logical XOR Routine.
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7 TESTING THE REGISTER UNIT
The register unit should be one of the units tested the most. If there are errors present in the 
register unit, then the entire microprocessor will produce faulty results. The processor is 
assumed to have 32 general purpose registers (GPRs), each 32 bits wide.
7.1 Fault Model
Errors occurring in the register unit are classified in one of the following ways:
1. No register is accessed or a nonexistent register is accessed.
2. An incorrect register is accessed.
3. One or more of the bits in the register data is wrong.
By moving specific data to and from registers in the C program, checking the values, and 
then repeating, the above types of errors can be detected. However, the test does not guarantee 
that all registers will be utilized as desired. A C program can only recommend that a register be 
used for a variable. This is achieved with the declaration of register before the type of 
variable, for example, register int x. The compiler will do its best to use a register for 
the particular variable.
7.2 Functional Vectors
The functional vectors for the register unit are simple to derive. By changing the value of a 
register to a value that is exactly opposite of its previous value, the switching in the bits will be 
maximized and there will be a higher likelihood of detecting an error. For example, if we load a 
register with 0x33333333, check the result, then load the register with Oxcccccccc and check the 
result again, we accomplish the high level of switching in the bits. Also, it is important to use 
unique data values for each register when testing them so that if the wrong register is chosen, as 
in condition 2 above, the consistency check does not coincidentally get the correct value. Figure 
9 shows an example of a portion of the code.
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CheckRegisterUnit()
register int RO, Rl, R2 r
for (int i=0; i < LOOP ITERATIONS; i++) {
RO = 0x00000000;
R1 = 0x11111111;
R2 = 0x22222222;
if (R0 != 0x00000000) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
if (Rl != Oxllllllll) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
if (R2 != 0x22222222) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
RO = Oxffffffff; // exact opposite
R1 = Oxeeeeeeee; // of previous values.
R2 = Oxdddddddd;
if (RO != Oxffffffff) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
if (Rl != Oxeeeeeeee) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
if
}
(R2 != Oxdddddddd) UpdateStats(1, ru) ;
Figure 9: Example Code for the Register Unit.
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8 TESTING THE LOAD/STORE UNIT
The purpose of the load/store routine is to test the hardware associated with loads and stores. 
This includes the hardware for the effective address calculation, any load or store queues, and 
any other related hardware involved in the load/store unit. Note that this routine is not intended 
to explicitly test the memory or the data cache. A separate routine is used to test the data cache 
and is explained in the thesis to be written by Hari Kommaraju [18].
8.1 Fault Model
The fault model for a load or store operation assumes the following types of errors:
1. An error in the memory address of the load or store. This can be due to a bit flip in the 
address or to an incorrect calculation of the effective address.
2. An error in the data for the load or store.
8.2 Functional Vectors
The functional vectors for the load/store unit attempt to catch the errors described in the 
fault model above. Arrays are used to allocate areas in memory and transfer data to and from 
these locations. The data that is transferred is chosen in such a way as to maximize the switching 
of the bit values in each memory location. The following paragraph outlines this process.
First, ten integer arrays with sixteen locations each are allocated and initialized to specific 
values, for example, i n t  a [1 6 ] = {O xaaaaaaaa , O xaaaaaaaa , ... }. Tenarraysare 
chosen so that a reasonable amount of memory is allocated each time the routine is called.
Second, the data from one initialized array is transferred to the corresponding location of another 
array. This operation consists of loading the value from one location and storing it to another. 
Third, the values in each location of the array with new data are checked for the correct value. 
This involves an additional load operation. Finally, some dependent load and stores are executed 
to prevent any compiler optimizations. Figure 10 shows an example of the code.
By transferring the data from one array to another in this manner, any bits that have been 
erroneously flipped in the data will be detected in the consistency checks. Similarly, any bits in
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the address of the memory location that are changed or erroneously calculated will result in the 
wrong memory location being accessed and will also be detected in the consistency check.
CheckLoadStoreUnit()
int g [ 16] = {0x33333333, 0x33333333, ..., 0x33333333}; 
int h[16] = {Oxcccccccc, Oxcccccccc, ..., Oxcccccccc};
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
h[0] = g [0]; 
h[l] = g [1]; . . . 
h [15] = g [15];
if (h[0] != 0x33333333) UpdateStats(Err, lsu);
if (h[l] != 0x33333333) UpdateStats(Err, lsu); . . .
if (h[15] != 0x33333333) UpdateStats(Err, lsu) ;
// Dependent loads and stores
g[0] = Oxcccccccc; // Opposite of previous value 
g [l] = g[0]; . . .
g [ 15] = g[14];
if (g[0] != Oxcccccccc) UpdateStats(Err, lsu);
if (g[l] != Oxcccccccc) UpdateStats(Err, lsu); . . .
if (g[15] != Oxcccccccc) UpdateStats(Err, lsu);
// Copy back the contents for the next loop 
g [0] = h[0]; 
g[l] = h [1]; 
g [15] = h [15];
Figure 10; Example Code for the Load/Store Unit.
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9 TESTING THE INSTRUCTION FETCH UNIT
The instruction fetch unit encompasses all of the hardware involved in the instruction fetch 
cycle. This typically involves hardware such as the instruction register, an instruction cache, and 
perhaps an instruction queue. There may be other hardware as well. The general idea of testing 
the instruction fetch unit is by means of executing instructions. The instruction cache behaves as 
any cache, but cannot contain just any data. It must contain valid instructions. Potential cache 
faults result in an alteration of these instructions that may lead to errors in the program.
9.1 Fault Model
An operation in a high-level program can be viewed as a sequence of one or more machine- 
level instructions, where every instruction represents the elementary data-transfer and data- 
manipulation operations for a given architecture. Figure 11 shows an example of some C 
program statements that are converted to possible machine-level instructions.
C Code Possible Corresponding Machine-level instructions
int R1 = 4 ; 
int R2 = 8; 
int R3 = 55;
RO = Ri + R2 - R3;
if (RO != 12) Err++;
mov Rl, 4 
mov R2, 8 
mov R3, 55 
add RO, Rl, R2 
sub RO, RO, R3 
beq RO, 12, #done 
addi RO, RO, 1 
done:
Figure 11: Example Machine-Level Instructions.
The general form of an instruction is shown in Figure 12, where the opcode is the operation 
code for the given instruction and A, B, and C are the addressing fields. The addressing fields 
can be one of the following:
• a register number,
• a constant value,
• or an offset.
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opcode A B C
Figure 12: General Instruction Format.
Errors in the instruction fetch unit are related to the machine-level instructions and will 
occur under one or more of the following events:
1. One or more instructions become inactive; therefore, the operation is not executed 
completely.
2. Instructions that are normally inactive become active. This includes an instruction 
opcode that gets changed in such a way so that another instruction gets activated. For 
example, if the opcode for the ADD instruction is 0001 and the opcode for the OR 
instruction is 0011, it is conceivable that the ADD instruction opcode may get changed 
to the OR instruction in the event of a SEU.
3. One or more of the addressing fields of the instruction is changed to the wrong value.
4. A branch to an incorrect address somewhere within the software tool that was not 
intended.
In the first case, if the operation is not executed completely, then the final result will be 
incorrect and the check instruction will catch the error. In the second case, either a wrong, but 
valid instruction will get executed, or an invalid instruction will get executed. If a valid, but 
wrong instruction gets executed, the check instruction should catch the error unless the wrong 
instruction is a branch. If that is true, as long as the branch jumps to a location within the 
program space as in the fourth case, the program is capable of reporting the error. However, if 
the branch jumps outside of the program space, an exception will occur and the program will 
crash. If an invalid instruction gets executed, an illegal instruction exception will occur and also 
cause the system to crash. If an error occurs in one of the addressing fields, several scenarios 
are possible:
1. The wrong register is used.
2. An invalid register is used.
3. An error in the constant value is used.
4. An invalid constant is used.
5. A wrong offset value is used.
6. An invalid offset is used.
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In 1 and 3, the error will be detected by the check instruction. In 2, 4, and 6, the system will 
most likely generate an exception and the system will crash. In the case of 5, if the error in the 
offset causes the instruction to jump to another location in the program, the error will most likely 
be detected. If the error causes the program to jump to a location outside of the program space, 
the system will generate a segmentation fault and crash.
In general, any instructions that are affected in such a way so that an illegal instruction is 
generated, or that a branch to an illegal portion of memory is executed, the operating system will 
produce a segmentation fault and crash the program. These types of errors are highly likely and 
there is nothing that can be done when they occur. It is the less severe, wrong but still legal 
instructions that our program hopes to detect and report.
The above fault model is fairly straightforward, but it is still difficult to explicitly test the 
instruction fetch unit and even more tricky to attribute errors to its hardware. The general idea 
behind the test routine in this program is to execute several types of operations and monitor the 
types of errors found. For example, if there are errors occurring in many different places in the 
instruction fetch routine (i.e., errors in more than one type of operation), we can make the 
hypothesis that there are upsets somewhere in the instruction fetch unit. This correlates with the 
assumptions that any SEUs occurring will be localized to a specific area and are fairly 
infrequent.
In addition, by comparing the output from the routine for this unit with the output from other 
units, it is possible to further conclude that certain types of errors are most likely occurring in the 
instruction fetching hardware. As an example, if the integer operations or the floating point 
operations do not produce any errors when running their individual routines, but they all produce 
errors when running the instruction fetch routine, then there is most likely a problem in the 
instruction fetching hardware.
9.2 Functional Vectors
As stated in the previous section, the test code for this unit executes various instructions of 
different types. Each instruction performs a data manipulation or a data transfer, and at the 
completion of the instruction, the expected value is checked. If there is an error in the instruction 
performing the operation to be checked such that the processor is able to continue executing, it 
should be caught by the following consistency check.
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A portion of the code used to check the instruction fetch unit is shown in Figure 13. The 
actual routine has more operations included. It can be seen that there are many types of 
computations performed and that unless there are multiple types of errors found, it cannot be 
assumed that the errors are occurring in the instruction fetch unit. In that case, further tests must 
be run. But, if there are multiple errors detected in this routine, then the situation is reported and 
the appropriate action can be taken.
void ChecklnstructionFetchUnit( )
register long iRO, iRl, iR2, iR3, iR4, iR5, iR6, iR7, iR8; 
register double fRO, fRl, fR2, fR3, fR4, fR5, fR6, fR7, fR8; 
long i [4] = {12, 3, 192, 48};
double m [4] = {12001.2, 3000.3, 192019.2, 48004.8};
for (int i=0; i < LOOP_ITERATIONS; i++) {
iRO = i [ 0]; // load
if (iRO != 12) { ErrType = 1; goto END; }
iR4 = iRO + iRl; // integer add
if (iR4 != 15) { ErrType = 2; goto END; }
fRO = m[0]; // load
if ((int)(fR0*10) != 120012) { ErrType = 1; goto END; }
fR4 = fRO + fRl; // floating point add
if (fR4 != 15001.5) { ErrType = 6; goto END; }
iR4 = iR6 - iR4; // integer sub
if (iR4 != 240) { ErrType = 3; goto END; }
fR4 = fR6 - fR4; // floating point subtract
if (fR4 != 240024.0) { ErrType = 7; goto END; }
iR6 = iR4 * iR5; // integer multiply
if (iR6 != 3600) { ErrType = 4; goto END; }
fR6 = fR4 * fR5; // floating point multiply
if ( fR6 != 3600720036.0 ) { ErrType = 8; goto END; }
iR7 = iR7 / 10000; // floating point divide
if (iR7 != 4095) { ErrType = 5; goto END; }
iR8 = iR7 / iR5; // integer divide
if (iR8 != 273) { ErrType = 5; goto END; }
END: if (ErrType != PrevErrType) {
printf("Err in IFU: Multiple Instructions have errors.\n"); 
UpdateStats(1, IFUnit);
PrevErrType = ErrType;
} else SameErrs++;
Figure 13: Example Code for the Intruction Fetch Unit.
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10 TESTING THE BRANCH PROCESSING UNIT
The branch processing unit includes any hardware used in branch prediction or branch 
control, for example the branch target instruction cache, the branch history table, and perhaps 
some control registers. The routine to test the branch processing unit aims at detecting any 
control flow errors occurring as a result of corrupted branches or branch addresses.
10.1 Fault Model
Errors expected in the branch processing unit are as follows:
1. The target address for the branch is wrong
2. One or more errors in the control registers associated with branch processing
3. One or more errors in the status bits
Errors in the actual prediction for a given branch cannot be detected from a high level 
program. If a SEU affects the prediction for a certain branch, no error will be produced. The 
worst that will happen is the processor will have to backtrack and re-execute the branch with the 
correct path.
10.2 Functional Vectors
The branch processing unit is tested using an if-then-else tree. A pictorial 
representation of the if-then-else tree is shown in Figure 14. Each circle in the tree 
represents an i f statement. If the condition of the i f statement evaluates to true, then the right 
branch of the tree is followed; otherwise the left branch is followed—i.e., i f  condition = TRUE 
then go right, else go left. At the end of each path resides a leaf node containing a numerical 
value called the condition code. Each condition code is unique and represents a specific path in 
the tree.
To use this tree structure in testing the branch processing unit, we begin by defining a global 
variable to be set to the value of the condition code of the expected path to be taken in the tree. 
We will call this variable ConditionCode. Next, we represent the left branch of every node 
in the tree with a 0, or FALSE value, and the right branch of every node with a 1, or TRUE 
value. Also, we define a set of bits—one for each level in the tree—to be used as the condition
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for each if statement. The Condi tionCode variable is set to correspond to value of the 
condition bits. For example, a ConditionCode value of 10 will correspond to the condition 
bits—starting with level one— 1010 (right, left, right, left).
Figure 14: If-Then-EIse Tree for the Branch Prediction Unit.
As stated above, if the bit for a particular level in the tree is 0, or FALSE, then the left 
branch will be taken; otherwise, the bit is a 1, or TRUE, and the right branch will be taken. In 
this way, we can control the flow of the program. We check for errors when we reach a leaf 
node. If the ConditionCode variable is set to what we would expect it to be at this node, 
then no error exists. However, if the ConditionCode variable is set to something different 
than expected, an error has occurred. In addition to checking for the expected value of the 
ConditionCode variable at each node, we also set the condition bits for each if statement to 
new values and update the ConditionCode variable so that a different path in the tree is 
executed the next time through. Once all the paths in the tree have been taken, the process 
repeats. Figure 15 shows a code example using a two-level tree with the above strategies.
The actual routine for this unit uses a tree with six levels. The idea is to create a big enough 
tree with enough branches so that if a control-flow error occurs and the branch address is 
corrupted, there will be a reasonable probability that it will branch somewhere else in the tree 
and the error will be detected because the value of the ConditionCode variable will be 
wrong. Also, if the status bits or the control registers are corrupted, then a branch may not 
follow the appropriate path, and again the error will be detected.
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int ConditionCode;
void CheckBranchProcessingUnit() {
register unsigned short bO = 1, bl = 1;
ConditionCode=3;
for (done = 0; done < LOOP_ITERATIONS; done++) { 
if (bO) { 
if (bl) {
if (ConditionCode != 3) { UpdateStats(1, BPUnit); }
else { ConditionCode = 2; 
bO = 1; 
bl = 0;
}
else {
if (ConditionCode != 2) { UpdateStats(1, BPUnit); }
else { ConditionCode = 1; 
bO = 0; 
bl = 1;
else {
if (bl) {
if (ConditionCode != 1) { UpdateStats(1, BPUnit); }
else { ConditionCode = 0; 
bO = 0; 
bl = 0;
}
else {
if (ConditionCode != 0) { UpdateStats(1, BPUnit); }
else { ConditionCode = 3; 
bO = 1 ; 
bl = 1;
}
}
} if (bO)
} // for loop
Figure 15: Example Code for the Branch Processing Unit.
38
11 FAULT INJECTION METHODS
Fault insertion, the deliberate injection of faults into a system, is a useful validation method 
in any system development process where the error handling and detection is a vital concept. 
Typically, fault insertion techniques fall into two main categories: physical, or hardware fault 
insertion, and simulated, or software fault insertion. For this tool, only physical fault insertion 
techniques are used because these are most representative of the types of errors that the tool is 
trying to detect. Also, in using simulation-based fault insertion techniques, a software model of 
the system is required which is difficult and expensive to obtain.
The most commonly used physical fault injector is heavy-ion radiation [20], but in some 
cases electromagnetic fields or power supply disturbances are also used. For this thesis, we 
present results for power supply disturbances only. Radiation experiments and other tests are 
scheduled at JPL in the near future. In addition, there are no known effective methods of using 
electromagnetic fields to produce transient errors inside the microprocessor. As a result, power 
supply disturbances are our best method for producing errors inside the processor so that we may 
test our software tool.
11.1 Radiation Injection
Bombarding integrated circuits with heavy-ion radiation or a high-energy proton beam can 
cause SEUs in the circuits of the processor. Irradiation of a circuit must be performed in a 
vacuum. This is due to the fact that air molecules attenuate heavy ions. Also, the packaging of 
the circuit has the potential to prevent the heavy ions from reaching the depletion regions. Such 
things as heat sinks and cooling towers will get in the way of radiation insertion.
11.2 Power Supply Disturbances
Disturbing the power supply is a simple way to cause errors in the system. This actually 
models some of the errors happening on Earth due to power surges and disturbances common in 
industrial applications. This method was used in [3] and [21] in conjunction with heavy-ion 
radiation on a MC6809E processor. Short voltage drops were caused at the power supply pin of 
the CPU using a MOS power transistor. A test CPU and a reference CPU were run in lock step
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and the external buses were compared while the power supply pin of the test CPU was being 
disturbed. For this project, we do not have visibility of the external buses on our test boards and 
cannot compare the values of a reference CPU to a test CPU. However, we accomplish the 
power supply disturbances by connecting a variable, digital power supply source to the power 
supply pin of the microprocessor. On our test boards, we are able to access the pin that leads 
directly to the CPU and only the CPU. Chapter 12 explains this setup in further detail.
Although the reduction in power supply voltage reduces power consumption, the real trade­
off is the increase of delay. If the power supply voltage is scaled down while all other 
parameters are kept constant, the propagation delay time will increase. This, in turn, will affect 
the critical path in the system causing it to take longer to execute. If the critical path does not 
complete in the time allotted, an error is likely to occur. This is precisely the behavior we are 
hoping for. Results are presented in the next section for these tests.
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12 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Preliminary results on the validity of our tool have been obtained from one of the fault 
injection methods described in the previous section, namely power supply disturbances. As 
explained, power supply disturbances are currently the only available method we have at our 
facility to test our tool. However, further experiments using alpha-particle radiation are 
scheduled to take place at JPL in the future. Disturbances in the power supply are used as a way 
to cause errors in the microprocessor that may be detected by our software program.
When doing fault injection using radiation or power supply disturbances, we do not know 
where the fault is going to happen. Therefore, all parts of the chips should be exercised by using 
all the functional units, e.g., floating-point as well as integer units. If we fail to do this, a fault 
may happen somewhere and never show up as an error. If we exercise all units and output the 
results, we can detect errors happening almost anywhere in the chip.
12.1 Experimental Setup
As explained in Chapter 5, the PowerPC MPC750 is the processor for which the preliminary 
version of our tool is based. The test boards containing the MPC750 processor are based on an 
embedded system and are referred to as single board computers (SBCs). In our case, the board is 
referred to as the SBC750.
The experimental setup for our tests includes several parts:
• the target system under test -  WindRiver’s SBC750,
• a Hewlett Packard E3631A Power Supply,
• a host computer,
• debugging software, and
• HyperTerminal software used to obtain the serial communication between the host 
computer and the target.
Figure 16 shows an example of the hardware setup used for these experiments.
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Figure 16: Sample Hardware Setup.
Once the hardware setup is ready, our tool is downloaded to the target board as part of the 
firmware. Then, from a HyperTerminal window on the host computer, the program is run and 
the output is monitored. Any occurrences of errors are reported through the use of print 
statements to the HyperTerminal window. An EEPROM is included on the board and some of 
the statistics are also written to this memory. The EEPROM is nonvolatile and can only be 
erased if explicitly told to do so. Therefore, any data written to this area does not get lost when 
the board is reset. This is useful when the program hangs, or if an error occurs while printing to 
the HyperTerminal window.
The firmware that is loaded onto the board is another product of WindRiver. It is called 
visionWARE and provides the basic communication with the target along with components such 
as device drivers, diagnostics, flash programming, and network support. A user’s manual for 
setting up the hardware and running the tool is included in Appendix A.
12.2 Program Output
The program is designed to output statements that give helpful information about the state of 
the system. If an error is detected, the program will print the error, it will print which routine 
detected the error, and it will print some statistical information. All of the statistical information 
is calculated in one routine called UpdateStats(). The UpdateStats() routine is called 
every time an error is detected, as well as when each routine completes. It keeps track of how 
long each routine has been executing along with some basic statistics. If an error is found, the 
information printed includes
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• the line of code corresponding to the consistency check that failed,
• the total number of errors found in the particular routine,
• the error rate of the particular routine,
• the mean time between errors (MTBE), and
• the total number of errors found up to that point.
The error rate is calculated by dividing the number of errors by the total running time of the 
routine up to the time of the error. The MTBE is calculated by dividing the running time by the 
number of errors. It is difficult to be more precise or to add additional calculations without 
significantly increasing the overhead of the program. The next section discusses the overhead in 
more detail.
12.3 Overhead
The overhead in this program includes the code to start up the program, to check for errors, 
to calculate the statistics, to print the information to the screen, and for basic flow control. Over 
half of each routine includes instructions that are involved in the consistency checks, the print 
statements, and the flow control. This leaves a reasonably high level of probability that errors 
will occur in one of the overhead instructions instead of one of the test instructions. However, 
even if errors occur in these other statistical-type instructions, it is still possible for the program 
to detect that there is a problem.
12.4 Programming Issues
One of the main programming issues faced when attempting to test our program is the 
problem of compiler optimizations. Most compilers offer high levels of optimizations that intend 
to improve the code and make it faster to execute on the processor. In our case, however, we do 
not desire such optimizations. “Smart” compilers may regard many of our computations as 
unnecessary. These compilers have only the final result in mind and will nullify our attempts at 
testing specific hardware for errors. For example, the compilers might change a conditional 
branch to an unconditional branch if the condition is a constant value.
Another issue is the amount of CPU time that the program uses. If transient errors are 
present, our diagnostic program requires the majority of the CPU time when executing.
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Otherwise, any applications running at the same time that require intensive CPU usage will 
likely be the main culprit for any errors. The operating system alone requires a certain amount of 
CPU time that is unavoidable, but exactly how much CPU time will vary. We ran an experiment 
to determine the approximate amount of CPU time our program would obtain when no other 
applications other than the operating system were running. The results are presented in the next 
section.
A third issue is to reduce the error latency as much as possible by flooding the execution 
units with millions of operations. Once a fault occurs, it may take several clock cycles before it 
propagates to an observable error. By maximizing the number of computations performed in 
each unit, this error latency is minimized. Table 9 outlines the number of computations that are 
performed in each routine along with the approximate number of operations executed every 
second.
The speed of the MPC750 is 233 MHz, so in the best case, we can expect 233x106 
operations per second. That is, one operation occurring per clock cycle. In that case, if a 
transient error were to occur, it will be detected on the very next clock cycle. From the table, we 
can see that the logical operations are approximately equal to this best-case scenario. Keeping in 
mind that the running time and the operations per second in the table are approximate, it should 
also be noted that logical operations are performed two at a time, one in each integer unit. 
Therefore, the best-case scenario for the logical operations is actually twice the speed of the 
processor—466 MHz. The error latency for the logical routines is then estimated as two clock 
cycles. The error latency for other routines can be estimated in the same way.
The overhead involved in each routine should also be taken into account when considering 
the number of operations per second. For every operation used to test a particular unit, there is a 
consistency check involved. The consistency check operations are not included in the count for 
the total operations in Table 9, but the time that they take to execute is included in the 
approximate running time.
Another issue involving overhead includes operating system requirements. In our test 
environment, the board we used did not have an operating system running on it. In commercial 
systems, however, there will be an operating system that will require some amount of CPU time. 
To gauge approximately how much CPU time a typical operating system needs, we ran our 
program on an HP PA-RISC Unix machine while no other programs were running. Using the
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Unix-based time command, we found that our program will get approximately 80% of the CPU 
cycles, and the operating system requires about 20% of the CPU cycles. The percentages were 
produced based on the program’s total CPU time, as a percentage of elapsed time.
Table 9: Operations and Running Times for Each Routine.
Routine
Operations 
per loop
Number 
of loops
Total
Operations
Approx.
Running
Time
Approx. 
Operations 
Per Second
Register Unit 40 8,000,000 320,000,000 6.34 s 50.47x10°
Instruction Fetch Unit 32 8,000,000 256,000,000 92.04 s 2.78x10"
Integer Addition 40 8,000,000 320,000,000 9.35 s 34.22x10'’
Integer Subtraction 40 8,000,000 320,000,000 9.12 s 35.09x10°
Integer Multiplication 58 8,000,000 464,000,000 18.21 s 25.48x10°
Integer Division 50 8,000,000 400,000,000 33.72 s 11.86x10°
Logical AND 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.71 s 225.35x10°
Logical OR 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.64 s 250.00x10°
Logical XOR 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.71 s 225.35x10°
Integer Unit 2 40 adds & multiplies 8,000,000 640,000,000 48.75 s 13.13x10°
Floating Point Add 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.82 s 195.12x10°
Floating Point Subtract 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.82 s 195.12x10°
Floating Point Multiply 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.83 s 192.77x10°
Floating Point Divide 20 8,000,000 160,000,000 0.82 s 195.12x10°
Branch Processing Unit 7 8,000,000 56,000,000 6.09 s 9.20x10°
Load/Store Unit 320 loads, 192 stores 80,000 40,960,000 13.24 s 3.09x10°
Data Cache 2 3,300,000 6,600,000 15.97 s 0.41x10°
12.5 Results
This section shows the results obtained from various experiments. The hardware test setup 
and some of the issues involved have been discussed in the previous sections. The results 
presented here include those for the following experiments:
• power supply disturbances,
• weak radiation exposure, and
• temperature increases coupled with power supply disturbances.
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12.5.1 Power supply disturbances
The most interesting results obtained were those from the power supply disturbances. Four 
different boards were used to verify consistent behavior on identical platforms. The power 
supply disturbances were generated by attaching the HP digital power supply unit to the power 
supply pin of the processor and then reducing the voltage. Table 10 gives a summary of the data 
gathered. The purpose of these tests was to determine if our software would be able to detect 
errors occurring in the microprocessor. The goal was not to obtain an accurate number of how 
many power supply disturbances will result in hangs or how many errors will be detected. We 
simply wanted to verify program functionality.
In the table, the “No. Tests” column enumerates the number of tests resulting in a problem 
with the program, whether it was a hang, or some kind of error. The “Voltage Range” is the 
range of voltages used to produce the errors. The lower voltage in the voltage range represents 
the threshold voltage at which the program could not operate at all. The upper voltage in the 
range represents the lowest value that the voltage could be reduced to without causing the 
program to result in an error or hang. The “Hangs” column represents the number of tests from 
column 2 that resulted in a hang. Similarly, the “Program Detected” column represents the 
number of tests from column 2 that resulted in an error detected by the program.
Table 10: Results from the Power Supply Disturbance Experiments.
Board No. No. Tests Voltage Range (in Volts)
Control F ow Errors Detected
Hangs Program Detected
1 45 1.99-2.10 31 14
2 35 2.00-2.08 26 9
3 25 2.10-2.29 18 7
4 25 2.08-2.20 17 8
We expect that the errors produced in the microprocessor will fall under one of two main 
categories: control flow errors and data errors. Control flow errors (sequencing errors) are 
associated with upsets in the program counter (PC), certain special function registers (e.g. control 
registers), and status registers. Data errors, on the other hand, are associated with upsets in the 
data memory, counters, etc. Control flow errors are generally more severe than data errors, 
which simply change data words.
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The types of errors detected by our program due to the power supply disturbances appeared 
to be control flow errors. There were no data errors found. Either the program would hang and 
no error statements were printed, or error statements were printed and the program would 
eventually hang. The latter were classified as program detected control flow errors. Sometimes, 
the errors detected by the program were caught by the branch processing unit, and other times 
the print statements would output at the wrong times, indicating erroneous jumps in the program. 
Also, when the power supply voltages were dropped and held constant, multiple runs at the same 
voltage resulted in similar outputs. In those cases, the program would usually fail in the same 
location and produce the same type of errors. Power supply drops are modeled by delay faults 
and delay faults will affect the critical path in the system. If the exact same program is run at the 
same voltage, then the same critical path will usually be affected and the program will fail in the 
same place every time.
12.5.2 Weak radiation exposure
A third experiment involved exposing the microprocessor to a weak radiation source 
emanating from an ionization chamber out of a smoke detector. Inside the ionization chamber is 
a small amount of Americium-241 (perhaps 0.0002 g). The radioactive element Americium has 
a half-life of 432 years, and is a good source of alpha particles. Although the amount of 
radiation in a smoke detector is predominantly alpha radiation, it is of extremely small quantity. 
Also, almost all of the alpha radiation particles cannot penetrate a sheet of paper, and it is 
blocked by several centimeters of air. This is why a special facility is needed to do the radiation 
testing that involves a vacuum and a particle beam.
The ionization chamber was removed from the smoke detector and placed directly on top of 
the microprocessor. The microprocessor has a cover over it and because most alpha particles 
cannot penetrate paper, they also cannot penetrate a metal cover. However, the motivation 
behind this experiment was to see if enough particles actually did get past the cover of the 
processor and into the circuitry to cause an error. The laws of probability suggest that it is 
possible for a few of the particles to penetrate the metal cover.
If an error were to be detected by our tool during the time that the ionization chamber is 
placed on the microprocessor, we would be able to express confidence that our program is 
working as intended. However, the program was run for several days with the Americium-241
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radiation in place and no errors were found. This does not prove anything negative about our 
program; it simply tells us that further tests are required. It does provide an interesting 
experiment, however.
12.5.3 Temperature increases coupled with power supply disturbances
The last type of experiments involved raising the temperature of the processor environment 
while at the same time lowering the power supply voltage. The idea here was to run our tool at 
the lowest voltage possible without producing any errors or hangs, and then increase the 
temperature in hopes of generating different types of errors than those of dropping the power 
supply voltage alone. Significant increases in temperature will reduce the performance of the 
processor causing the gates to switch at a slower speed. This is similar to the delay faults caused 
by power supply drops. Unfortunately, our methods of temperature increase were informal and 
unregulated and did not produce any significant results. However, the idea may be useful and 
provide supportive data if more official laboratory setups were available to perform the 
experiments.
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13 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The goal of the NASA HPCC Remote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project is to 
transfer commercial supercomputing technology into space. The difficulty NASA is 
encountering is that radiation hardened components are both extremely expensive and lag several 
generations behind the commercial state of the art components.
The goal of this project is to provide a tool to help evaluate and analyze the vulnerability of 
microprocessors exposed to alpha-particle radiation in space applications. Its intention is to 
provide information on the current state of the system and collect as many in-flight transient 
errors as possible to try and prevent any catastrophic events. By identifying and localizing errors 
occurring in the processor, appropriate action can be taken to prevent or alleviate further errors 
from occurring before the system as a whole crashes or becomes unstable.
We have shown many advantages of using this type of self-monitoring software tool for 
error measurements. It has excellent potential for accurate localization of a single-event upset 
(SEU) to within a small functional block. The error latency can be brought down to one to a few 
instruction cycles in most cases. Also, the probability of capturing an SEU is very high. The 
tool is designed to be portable to different systems as well as to be used during long space 
missions to periodically measure the error rates. Such a tool can give an early warning to the 
system of increased error rates.
We have presented results from power-supply disturbances as a method for physical-fault 
injection in the evaluation of the software tool. The results show that our tool is capable of 
detecting errors within the microprocessor as well as successfully reporting those errors. 
Although the tool is currently in a preliminary state, it has excellent potential to provide the type 
of reliability and error detection that the REE project is looking for. However, there are still 
areas of possible improvement and testing to be done before the final version is solidified.
The tool described in this paper is in a preliminary state. There is still considerable work 
left to do before the research is complete:
• The most important aspect yet to be done is the radiation testing. Bombarding integrated 
circuits with radiation will cause the SEUs in the circuits that our tool is designed to 
detect and locate. This type of hardware fault insertion introduces faults within the chip
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in several ways. The results from these tests will give us a feel for how often the system 
crashes and how many of the errors produced cause the system to hang. It will also give 
us information on how resilient and robust our program is when encountering errors.
• Another important factor includes extensive testing on other architectures. We primarily 
focused on the PowerPC architecture for the experimental results. Although, we did 
compile and run an early version of the program on the HP PA-RISC architecture as well 
as the x86 (AMD and Pentium) architecture to check for syntax errors and compilation 
issues. But, further testing is needed to ensure that the routines will catch a significant 
portion of errors on other platforms.
• Other tests that will be useful involve ground-based testing. The tool can be valuable in 
everyday environments where error rates may be abnormally high and a tool such as this 
one is needed to constantly monitor the state of a system. Power surges, internal noise 
sources, and capacitive and inductive crosstalk are all common causes of ground-based 
transient errors. The effectiveness of our software tool in these situations would be 
significant in determining its range of applications.
• It may be useful to add additional routines in the program to further test different parts of 
the hardware. Some other units that were not explicitly tested in our program may 
require further investigation into the feasibility of testing them from a high-level 
program.
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APPENDIX A REETOOL USER’S GUIDE
The REETool is intended to run continuously in the background of a computer system. It is 
currently being tested using a MPC750 PowerPC processor on a single board computer 
(SBC603/740/750). The intention of this tool is to be compiled and run on any processor, 
however this user’s guide describes how to run the tool on the SBC603/740/750.
A.1 Setting Up the Board With the Serial Connection
To set up the board and run the program, the following things are needed:
• A host computer with the vDESKTOP software installed
o The software for vDESKTOP is on the CD entitled “SINGLE BOARD 
COMPUTER Software & Documents”
• An available serial port
• An available Ethernet port
• The SBC750 board along with the Ethernet transceiver that comes with it
First, install the vDESKTOP software that comes on the CD entitled “SINGLE BOARD 
COMPUTER Software & Documents.” The setup file is located in the vDESKTOP directory on 
the CD. Second, connect the serial port on the test board with either the COM1 or COM2 port 
on the host computer. Third, connect the board to the network by first attaching the Ethernet 
transceiver to the JP28 slot on the board and then connecting the network cable to the 
transceiver. Read the following sections to learn how to use vDESKTOP and to run the 
program.
NOTE: The Ethernet connection is needed only if file transfer is to be done. There is 
already a version of firmware flashed on the board containing the software tool. Only a serial 
connection is needed to run the tool. However, to update the firmware along with a new version 
of the tool, the Ethernet connection is required. See Section A.2 below.
Additional information for setting up the serial connection and using vDESKTOP can be 
found in the “visionWARE SBC.doc” file on the “SINGLE BOARD COMPUTER Software & 
Documents” CD under \hsidocuments\visionWARE.
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A.2 Using vDESKTOP
Once vDESKTOP has been installed, it can be used to obtain a serial connection with the 
board. VDESKTOP uses tftp to transfer files between the host and the target board. The 
Ethernet transceiver is required by the tftp daemon. If no file transfer is to be done, then the 
Ethernet transceiver and network connection do not need to be connected.
There are three components in vDESKTOP: vCOM, vSHELL, and vFILE. VCOM uses a 
HyperTerminal to establish a serial connection with the board. Any input and output will be 
done in this window. VSHELL sets up the network parameters for the board. A valid Ethernet 
address, subnet mask, and gateway are needed for the Ethernet connection to work. The vFILE 
component brings up a file viewer so that files may be transferred between the host and the 
target.
A.2.1 Establishing a serial connection
To establish a serial connection,
• first click on the vCOM icon to bring up the HyperTerminal window,
• make sure the correct COM port is selected by right clicking in the 
HyperTerminal window and choosing Communications,
• make the connection by either clicking the circular arrow button, or selecting 
connect in the Tools drop-down menu.
When a connection is made, there will be a BKM> prompt in the vCOM window. If it 
does not work at first, try resetting the board, disconnecting and reconnecting in the 
HyperTerminal window.
A.2.2 Downloading the visionWARE file and updating the firmware
The tool is incorporated with the firmware file that was created with the visionWARE 
development kit. The development kit creates a binary file that can be used to update the 
memory containing the current firmware. This file, in general, is named 
update_projectname.bin. In this case it is named update_REETool.bin. To transfer the file to 
the target, make sure the target is on and bring up the vDESKTOP application.
Once a serial connection is made (see Section A.2.1), click on the vFILE button. This 
will start the tftp daemon and allow the transfer of files. In the file browser window, find the 
update REETool.bin file on the host directory structure, right click on it, and choose download. 
Once the file is downloaded, you should be able to see a list of all the files located in RAM on 
the target to confirm that it is there. Next, go to the vCOM window and click in it next to the 
BKM> prompt so that you can type in this window. Type the following command to update the 
firmware:
update \\your_hostname\wpdate_KEET ool.bin
When the firmware has been updated, there will be a floating-point exception that has 
occurred. This is not a problem, just reset the board and the new firmware should take effect.
A.3 Running the Program
To run the program, type ‘reetoof following by any command line options. Table 11 shows 
the command line options available when running the REETool. For example, if you wanted to 
test only the instruction fetch unit and the branch processing unit, you would type ‘reetool -ifu -  
bpu’. Or, if you wanted to run all of the routines, then type ‘reetool -all’. To see a listing of the 
options from vDESKTOP, type ‘help reetoof, or type ‘help’ to see all available commands. It 
does not matter what order the command line options are typed. The order has no effect on how 
the program is run.
A.4 Statistical Output
Output from the program is accomplished with print statements that send the output 
through the serial port to the HyperTerminal window (vCOM) in vDESKTOP. If errors are 
found, a statement with the check that failed is printed (in verbose mode) along with the current 
error rate and the mean time between errors (MTBE).
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Table 11: Command Line Options for REETool.
Command Line Option Description
-all Check all units
-ru Check Register Unit
-ifu Check Instruction Fetch
-ia Check Integer addition
-is Check Integer subtraction
-iu2 Check Integer unit 2
-la Check logical AND
-lo Check logical OR
-lx Check logical XOR
-im Check Integer multiplication
-id Check Integer division
-bpu Check Branch Processing Unit
-fpua Check Floating Point Unit Addition
-fpus Check Floating Point Unit Subtraction
-fpum Check Floating Point Unit Multiplication
-fpud Check Floating Point Unit Division
-fpu Check All Floating Point Unit Operations
-lsu Check Load/Store Unit
-dc Check Data Cache
-alii Check All the Integer Units (ia, is, im, id, iu2)
-alll Check All the Logical Units (la, lo, lx)
-once Run the routines specified only once.
-V Verbose mode - prints out more detailed 
information about any errors found.
A.5 Making Changes to the Program
Changes to the REETool can easily be accomplished with the visionWARE development kit. 
Once this kit is installed, the project for REETool can be loaded from the Project-^ Open Project 
menu. The source code for all the available drivers and diagnostics is included in this project. 
The source code for REETool is located under the User Components-^REETool-^ Source Files 
folder.
After the changes have been made, the project should be built by choosing the 
Build->Build vWARE command, or by clicking the build icon in the icon bar. Make sure that 
the build is a ROM version, not a RAM version. This can also be chosen in the build menu or 
from the icon bar. The ROM version creates the update_projectname.bin file that is used to 
update the firmware on the board. Once the new build file has been created, it can be loaded to 
the target as described above in Section A.2.
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